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BRAVE NEW WORLD, TEN YEARS
LATER: REVIEWING THE IMPACT OF
POLICY CHOICES IN THE





The 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), heralded the start of the Brave New
World of legally enforced digital locks on copyrighted works-
technological measures that can be used to restrict access to, and use
of copyrighted works. Unfortunately, neither these legal innovations,
nor the digital locks they were intended to protect, have proven to be
effective at containing widespread digital copying, suggesting that the
basic policy approach behind the WCT and WPPT may have been
overtaken by new technologies. Nevertheless, because many countries
have adopted the treaties and many others are being urged to do so in
a variety of international trade contexts, it appears that the treaties
are a fact of life for many national policymakers. At the same time,
the U.S. experience with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
1998 has shown that legal protection regimes for technological
t International Policy Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit non-
governmental legal services and advocacy organization, dedicated to the protection of
consumers' rights, freedom of expression and privacy in the digital environment.
(http://www.eff.org).
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protection measures (TPMs) can have adverse consequences on a
range of important public policies that reach well beyond the sphere
of copyright regulation. Based on the experience of the countries that
have implemented the WIPO Internet Treaties' TPM obligations, it is
clear that policy choices about the scope and structure of the legal
protection provided to TPMs have significant implications for both
national public policy priorities and access to knowledge on the
global level.
At the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the WCT and WPPT,
this paper considers the range of policy options available to countries
contemplating implementation of the WCT and WPPT, and what
lessons can be learned from countries that have implemented these
obligations about how, and how not, to structure legal protection for
TPMs. It provides a comparative review of the TPM legal regimes of
the United States, the European Union, Australia, and the WIPO
Draft Law on Copyright and Related Rights, and analyzes the policy
implications flowing from the differences in scope and structure of
those regimes. It concludes that none of the three most widely
adopted implementation models provide adequate safeguards to
prevent TPM laws from encroaching on non-copyright public policies
such as national competition regulation, citizens' access to
knowledge, freedom of expression and technology innovation. Since
WCT and WPPT compliance does not require countries to adopt the
DMCA's TPM regime, nor the European Union or WIPO draft law
implementation models, this paper concludes by providing countries
with a set of "damage minimization recommendations" for how to
structure TPM legal regimes to avoid some of the detrimental
consequences experienced under the United States' TPM regime.
INTRODUCTION
The 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
treaties, the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and WIPO Performances
and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), heralded the start of the Brave New
World of legally enforced digital locks on copyrighted works-
technological measures that can be used to restrict access to, and use
of copyrighted works.
Digital locks were not themselves new. Technological copy
restrictions had existed for over a decade. They had been widely used
on computer software for a period, then largely abandoned by the
software industry, when it became clear that they were unpopular
with customers and ineffective at preventing infringement. What
changed in 1996 with the adoption of the WCT and WPPT was that
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rightsholders' technological measures were-for the first time-
required to be enforced by legal sanctions as a matter of international
law. While certain national legal systems, most notably in the U.K.,
had previously provided limited legal protection to technical copy
restrictions, the WCT and WPPT were the first international legal
instruments, to contemplate legal protection for technical measures
that could restrict acts beyond mere reproduction of a copyrighted
work. Technological measures no longer needed to be
self-protecting--or un-hackable-to protect a copyrighted work.
Rightsholders could instead rely on violation of the law forbidding
circumvention of the technical measure to control use of and access
to, their works. It is hard to overstate the importance of this. Anti-
circumvention rules controlled by private rightsholders suddenly took
precedence over copyright law, and the public policy values
embodied in it. This was a radical shift indeed, and it is for this reason
that the adoption of the WCT and WPPT marks the key turning point
in modern global information policy regulation.
Unfortunately, neither these legal innovations, nor the digital locks
they were intended to protect, have proven to be effective at
containing widespread digital copying, suggesting that the basic
policy approach behind the WCT and WPPT may have been
overtaken by new technologies. Nevertheless, because many countries
have adopted the treaties and many others are being urged to do so in
a variety of international trade contexts, it appears that the treaties are
a fact of life for many national policymakers. At the same time, the
U.S. experience with its WCT implementation law, the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, has shown that legal protection
regimes for TPMs can have adverse consequences on a range of
important public policies that reach well beyond the sphere of
copyright regulation. Based on the experience in the United States,
and in other countries that have implemented the WIPO Treaties'
technological protection measures (TPMs) obligations, it is now clear
that policy choices about the scope and structure of the legal
protection provided to rightsholders' TPMs have significant
implications for both national public policy priorities and access to
knowledge on the global level.
At the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the WCT and WPPT, it
is appropriate that we consider two questions:
(1)Have legally enforced technological protection measures
been successful at their stated purpose of preventing
widespread digital copyright infringement?
2007]
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(2)What lessons can be learned from those countries that
have implemented these obligations about how, and how not,
to structure legal protection for TPMs?
The first question has been the subject of various papers.' In the
United States, the answer is clearly no. After seven years' experience
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), it is clear that
these provisions have not been successful at preventing---or even
slowing-widespread copyright infringement. There is mounting
evidence that content-based digital rights management technologies
will never be successful at doing so, since in a networked world, it
only takes one technologically-savvy person to break the DRM and
the work will be available in an unprotected format for all users, for
all time.2
At the same time, the overbroad U.S. legal protection regime has
caused serious collateral damage to consumers, scientific researchers,
competition and technological innovation. Moreover, from American
consumers' perspective, the statutory safeguards that were intended to
protect their ability to engage in non-copyright infringing uses have
failed to do so. Most classes of users of copyrighted works have lost
access to protected digital works, while technologically sophisticated
commercial infringers now routinely flout the legal bans imposed by
the DMCA.
Given that, this paper focuses on the second question. It starts from
the position that particular features of the U.S. TPM legal regime
have permitted misuses, which have in turn caused considerable
collateral harm to consumers, scientific research, education, freedom
of expression, competition and technological innovation. It surveys
the range of policy options open to countries obligated to implement
TPM obligations, and then considers whether alternative methods of
framing legal protection for TPMs-such as those adopted in
Australia and the European Community-might do less damage to
important non-copyright public policy goals than experienced under
the DMCA.
Part One of the paper considers the legal framework established by
Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18 of the WPPT and the various
policy options open to countries looking to implement their
See, e.g., Fred von Lohmann, Measuring The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against
the Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures, 24 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REv. 635 (2004).
2 Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado & Bryan Willman, The Darknet and the
Future of Content Distribution, ACM WORKSHOP ON DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT (2002),
available at http://www.crypto.stanford.edu/DRM2002/darknet5.doc.
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provisions. Part Two reviews the legal regime established by the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and highlights particular aspects of
that law that have resulted in detrimental impacts on non-copyright
public policy priorities. Part Three provides a comparative review of
the TPM legal regimes of the European Union, Australia, and the
WIPO Draft Law on Copyright and Related Rights, and analyzes the
policy implications flowing from differences in the scope and
structure of those regimes. Based on that review, Part Four sketches
out a set of "damage minimization recommendations" for how to
structure legal protection for TPMs to avoid some of the detrimental
consequences experienced in the United States. It makes five key
policy recommendations:
(1) The scope of legal protection for TPMs should be limited
to the boundaries of national copyright law by requiring a
nexus between the anti-circumvention ban and copyright
infringement;
(2) Countries that choose to regulate the manufacture and
supply of circumvention devices and services should establish
a flexible mechanism for permitting access to such
technologies for non-copyright infringing purposes;
(3) Countries should establish a mechanism to regulate
potential anti-competitive misuse of TPMs in a timely
manner;
(4) TPM circumvention penalties should be structured
carefully to minimize penumbral chill and to incentivize
socially beneficial activities such as scientific research,
education, cultural preservation by archives, libraries'
provision of access to knowledge resources, and facilitating
access to disabled communities.
(5) TPM regimes should incorporate a regular review of their
effectiveness and impact on non-infringing uses of
technologically protected works, and a process for granting
meaningful exemptions to the full scope of any
circumvention ban to make legitimate non-infringing uses of
digital works.
But first, a few cautionary notes are in order. By providing these
recommendations, I do not mean to suggest that any adverse impacts
of TPM legal regimes on non-copyright public policies will be
2007]
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eliminated. That is not the case. These provisions were controversial
at the time they were adopted in 1996, and have only become more so
in the intervening years. The recommendations in Part Four are
intended only as "damage minimization principles," not "best
practices" in any normative sense. Second, the highly technical nature
of TPM regimes has hindered appreciation of their significant role in
creating the infrastructure that can restrict access to knowledge across
the globe. Discussions about the features and scope of TPM regimes
have become almost exclusively the purview of copyright lawyers.
Several papers have already comprehensively, but somewhat
abstractly, described the different implementation approaches taken
by certain countries.3 But it would be a mistake to regard this as just
another exercise in comparative law. How TPM legal regimes are
structured is at the very heart of countries' ability to obtain access to
knowledge needed for development and the improvement of the
social conditions of their citizens. The stakes here are very high
indeed. It is for this reason that we need to take a clear-headed look at
the policy justifications given for the WCT and WPPT TPM
provisions, and what those provisions actually require of countries.
I. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK-SCOPE OF WCT AND
WPPT OBLIGATIONS
The international obligation to provide legal protection for
rightsholders' technological protection measures used on copyrighted
works is set out in Article 11 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. Article
11 of the WCT provides:
Contracting Parties shall provide adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of
effective technological measures that are used by authors in
connection with the exercise of their rights under this treaty
or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of
their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law.4
Article 18 of the 1996 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty
contains a similar obligation for phonograms (sound recordings) and
3 See, e.g., JEFFREY P. CUNARD, ET AL., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FIELD OF
DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT, WIPO document SCCR/10/2 (Aug. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/2003/sccr/doc/sccr10_2_rev.doc; June M. Besek,
Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report from the Kernochan Center for Law, Media
and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385 (2004).
4 WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M.65
(1997) [hereinafter WCT].
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performances (related rights).5 References in this paper to Article 11
of the WCT include Article 18 of the WPPT unless otherwise stated.
The scope of legal protection required by Article 11 of the WCT
has been a matter of ongoing debate for the last ten years. Countries
implementing the WCT and WPPT face a number of choices, each
with different policy implications.
First, they must decide whether new anti-circumvention legislation
is required at all, or whether the WCT obligations could be met by
existing national secondary copyright liability doctrines. At the
Diplomatic Conference leading up to adoption of the Internet Treaties
and in the subsequent discussions about U.S. implementation
legislation, there was discussion about whether Article lI's
obligations were satisfied by existing U.S. secondary copyright
liability doctrines, eliminating any need for new anti-circumvention
implementation legislation for this part of the treaty.6
Countries that decide to implement the WCT with specific anti-
circumvention legislation then face at least five further policy
decisions about how to structure legal protection for TPMs, reflecting
different dimensions of what might be considered "adequate legal
protection and effective legal remedies."
A. Circumvention Acts Versus Device Regulations
First, countries can choose to ban acts of circumvention (direct
violation of TPMs), or the creation and supply of circumvention tools,
technologies and devices, or the offering of circumvention services
utilizing such devices (indirect or secondary TPM violations, or what
was termed "preparatory acts" in the Diplomatic Conference
discussions), or a combination of all three.
Article 11 of the WCT is silent on this issue. However, the drafting
history of the WCT indicates that Member States did not intend to
require a ban on tools that can be used to circumvent TPMs. The
original document that formed the basis of discussion at the
5 See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No.
105-17 (1997), 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
6 Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED, Mar. 1997, at 64. The USPTO did
not accept that view, and chose to reintroduce specific legislation regulating digital rights
management technologies, similar in form to that unsuccessfully introduced in to the U.S.
Congress in 1994-1995 prior to the WIPO Diplomatic Conference. See H.R. 2441, 104th Cong.
(1995) and S. 1284, 104th Congress (1995) (both implementing the U.S. National Information
Infrastructure Taskforce White Paper, Intellectual Property and the National Information
Infrastructure: The Report of the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights, Sept. 1995,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/doc/ipnii/ipnii.pdf); see also JESSICA
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 122-45 (2001); Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at
WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369 (1997).
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Diplomatic Conference leading up to the treaty, the Basic Proposal
for a Treaty, contained a provision prohibiting the manufacture and
distribution of circumvention devices.7 However, that provision was
expressly rejected by the majority of WIPO Member States at the
Diplomatic Conference, and the more open-ended language of Article
11 was ultimately adopted in its place. Although some legal
commentators argue that a ban on circumvention devices or
"preparatory acts" creates a more efficient regulation because it
precludes circumvention tools from entering the hard-to-police area
of individual consumers' homes, 8 there does not appear to be any
legal necessity for interpreting Article 11 to require this conclusion,
and both the history of the treaty negotiations and the range of
interpretations given to this provision in Contracting Parties'
implementation legislation demonstrate that there was no consensus
on this issue at the 1996 Diplomatic Conference.
Creating each type of regulation or ban has different policy
implications. A prohibition on the act of circumvention of a TPM
targets individual would-be circumventers, including scientific
researchers and consumers customarily doing acts within their home.
By comparison, a device and/or services ban can be directed at
7 Article 13(1) of the BASIC PROPOSAL FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF THE
TREATY ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter BASIC PROPOSAL], provided
that:
Contracting Parties shall make unlawful the importation, manufacture or distribution
of protection-defeating devices, or the offer of performance of any service having the
same effect, by any person knowing or having reasonable grounds to know that the
device or service will be used for, or in the course of, the exercise of rights provided
under this Treaty that is not authorized by the rightholder or the law.
The U.S. proposal to WIPO included the following provision:
Contracting Parties shall make it unlawful to import, manufacture or distribute any
device, product, or component incorporated into a device or product, or offer or
perform any service, the primary purpose or effect of which is to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or otherwise circumvent, without authority, any process,
treatment, mechanism or system which prevents or inhibits the unauthorized exercise
of any of the rights under the Berne Convention or this Protocol.
PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON A POSSIBLE PROTOCOL TO THE BERNE CONVENTION 1-9, Sixth Session, Geneva (February
1996), WIPO Doc. BP/CEVI/12, cited in MIHALY FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE
INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION, 391-2
(2002).
8 FICSOR, supra note 7, at 549-550; Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Protection of Technological
Measures Protecting Works of Authorship: International Obligations and the US Experience.
Columbia Public Law Research Paper No. 05-938 (August 2005), at 8, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=785945; SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 976-977,
(2nd ed., 2006).
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manufacturers and commercial vendors of tools. While enforcement
of a device ban poses less privacy challenges for enforcement, it
makes it more difficult to preserve lawful non-infringing uses of
technologically protected works because unless the ban is structured
carefully, it will remove from the marketplace the tools necessary to
make those uses.
Regulation of circumvention devices and services can be achieved
in various ways. For instance, a regulation could restrict the
accessibility and use of devices and services by making them
available after an administrative agency review or through a
regulatory process, as in the former Australian TPM law.9
Alternatively, a TPM law could be framed as a direct prohibition on
the manufacture and supply of devices, as in the U.S. DMCA.10 This
type of ban will remove circumvention tools from the national
commercial marketplace (experience, of course, has shown that such
tools will almost certainly remain available from a variety of
noncommercial online sources, as illustrated by the continued
availability of various DVD ripping software). A device ban that is
not limited to devices that are designed for, and have no purpose other
than, circumvention of a TPM, is likely to harm the market for
investment and innovation in dual and multiple purpose technologies,
such as personal computers. It also raises significant concerns for
competition policy if the regulation leaves open the possibility of it
being misused to create monopolies in adjacent markets for
interoperable non-copyrightable technologies.
B. Access Control and Copy Control TPMs
The second dimension relates to the nature of the TPMs granted
legal protection. Does Article 11 require protection for access control
TPMs-namely TPMs that control all access to copyrighted works, or
only for copy control TPMs that prevent copying or other utilizations
of copyrighted works in line with copyright? Since access control
TPMs control all access to a copyrighted work, including access for
lawful, non-copyright infringing purposes, a legal ban on
circumventing access control TPMs would give rightsholders a new
right of controlling access to copyrighted works, separate from and
potentially unconnected to, the enumerated copyright rights granted to
authors under the Berne Convention, the WCT and the WPPT. Thus,
a legal prohibition on circumventing access control TPMs would
effectively override the traditional boundaries of copyright law.
9 Copyright Act, 1968 (Austl.), former § 116A(2)
10 17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(2) and (b).
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Article 11 is silent on this issue also. It requires protection of only
certain TPMs-those that are "effective" and that are "used by
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this treaty
or the Berne Convention."" The term "effective" is not defined and
has been interpreted in various ways by commentators. The terms
"access control" and "copy control" do not appear in the WCT and
WPPT.
Countries' national implementation laws diverge on this issue. The
United States' DMCA is based on a distinction between "access"
controls, and "copy" or use controls, and provides a higher level of
legal support to access control TPMs. 12 The United States has
required all its trading partners to adopt laws that protect both access
and copy control TPMs with the same level of differential protection
as the U.S. law.' 3 The European Community's Information Society
Directive also requires Member States to protect both access and copy
control TPMs. By comparison, the Australian Parliament expressly
decided against providing legal protection to "pure" access control
TPMs in its original TPM law.
14
There is also considerable disagreement amongst academic legal
commentators on this point. Those that consider that the WIPO
Treaties do not require legal protection against circumvention of
access control TPMs note that neither the Berne Convention nor the
Treaties recognize a right of "access" in the comprehensive
" WCT, supra note 4, art. 11.
12 The DMCA bans both the act of circumventing a TPM that controls access to a
copyrighted work (17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(l)) and the manufacture, importation, distribution and
trafficking in tools that can circumvent both TPMs that control access to a copyrighted work (17
U.S.C. §1201(a)(2)) and TPMs that effectively protect copyright rights in a work (17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (b)). Although the DMCA does not ban the act of circumventing a copy control TPM, that
distinction has no relevance where a TPM is both an access control and a copy control, as in the
case of the Content Scramble System technology that encrypts movies released on DVD.
13 The last nine bilateral free trade agreements entered into by the U.S. since 2002 have
required America's trading partners to accede to the WCT and to adopt TPM legal regimes
modeled on the DMCA: Singapore (Article 16.4(7)), Chile (Article 17.7(5)), Morocco (Article
15.5(8)), Australia (Article 17.4(7)), CAFTA (Article 15.5(7)), Bahrain (Article 14.4(7)), Oman
(Article 15.4(7)), Peru (Article 16.7(4)(c)) and Colombia (Article 16.7(4)(c)). See USTR-
Bilateral Trade Agreements, available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreementsLBilateral/
SectionIndex.html; see also Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related
Rights in the Information Society, art. 6(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Information
Society Directive].
14 Copyright Act, 1968, § 116A (Austl.) (amended 2005), and definition of "effective
technological protection measure" in section 10, inserted by Copyright Amendment (Digital
Agenda) Act, 2000 (Austl) [hereinafter Digital Agenda]. The definition was intended to be a
hybrid between access control TPMs and copy control TPMs, but it was not intended that legal
protection would be provided to "pure" access control TPMs. See AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT'S
HouSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, REPORT ON THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT (DIGITAL AGENDA) BILL 1999, ch. 4, jI
4.16-4.19 (1999).
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enumerated list of rights. 15 Thus, interpreting Article 11 as creating a
new and potentially very broad exclusive right, with full economic
status, in the absence of any reference to the notion of "access" in the
treaties is inappropriate. Other commentators simply state that
signatory countries are required to protect "pure" access control
TPMs.
16
Professors Ginsburg and Ricketson claim that Article 11 requires
protection of access control TPMs for two reasons. First, to provide
adequate protection for authors' rights of reproduction, as granted by
the Berne Convention. 17 They claim that accessing a work expressed
in digital form implicates the reproduction right under the Berne
Convention.18 This analysis turns on a particular interpretation of the
scope of the right of reproduction granted by the Berne Convention-
namely, that it extends to controlling temporary and transient
reproductions of digital copyrighted works, including those in
computers' Random Access Memory. The difficulty with this analysis
as a basis for justification is that there appears to be no international
agreement on the status of temporary reproductions in the digital
environment. This was a contentious issue at the Diplomatic
Conference leading up to the WCT. Member States expressly rejected
a provision that would have made it clear that transitory and
temporary reproductions were within the right granted to authors.
Thus it does not seem appropriate to base a legal obligation to protect
access controls on a temporary reproduction analysis.19 Professor
Ginsburg claims that access controls must be protected for a second
reason-because access control TPMs underpin the reproduction,
communication and distribution rights granted under the WCT.20 To
15 See Jacques de Werra, The Legal System of Technological Protection Measures Under
the WIPO Treaties, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, the European Union Directives and
Other National Laws (Japan, Australia) 11 (June 13, 2001) (paper presented at ALAI 2001
Congress: Adjuncts and Alternatives to Copyright, available at http://www.alai-
usa.org/2001__conference/Reports/dewerra.doc), citing Kamiel Koelman & Natali Helberger,
Protection of Technological Measures, in COPYRIGHT AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ELECTRONIC COPYRIGHT MANAGEMENT 9-10 (2000); see also Dr. Ian Kerr, Alana
Maurushat & Christian S. Tacit, Technological Protection Measures: Trends in Technological
Protection Measures and Circumvention Technologies, Part 1 (June 2003), available at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ac-calprogs/pda-cpb/pubs/protection/protection-e.pdf.
16 FICSOR, supra note 7, § C 11.9, CI 1.12.
17 Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 6-8; RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 8, § 15.13-15.14.
'8 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 8, § 15.15.
19 BASIC PROPOSAL, supra note 7; see also LITMAN, supra note 6, at 129; Agreed
Statements Concerning Article 1(4), WIPO Copyright Treaty, December 20, 1996; Jonathan
Band & Jeny Marcinko, A New Perspective on Temporary Copies: The Fourth Circuit's
Opinion in Costar v. Loopnet, 2005 STAN. TECH. L. REv. PI, available at http://stlr.
stanford.edu/STLR/Events.
20 RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 8, at § 15.16 ("[A]n access-controlled copy, even
if reproduced or communicated without authorization, will yield its copyist or recipient no
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the extent that this view relies on the same understanding of the status
of temporary reproductions it is also questionable. Invoking the rights
of distribution and communication also fail to demonstrate that
Article 11 requires legal protection for access control TPMs. Both of
these require a physical transfer, which could be protected by a "use"
control TPM. As the Basic Proposal made clear, the right of
communication to the public granted in the WCT involves a
transmission to the public that are not present in the same location.21
An anti-distribution control TPM would restrict the transfer of a
fixation or reproduction. An anti-communication control TPM would
restrict transmission of material, but not its perception or viewability.
In other words, it would require a "use" control TPM, but not an
access control TPM.
Accordingly, as a matter of copyright policy, Article 11 of the
WCT does not require legal protection of access control TPMs.
C. Nexus Between TPM Protection and Copyright Infringement
The third, and most important, dimension is the scope of legal
protection provided to TPMs. Does a TPM only get legal protection if
its circumvention is done for the purpose of copyright infringement,
or would lead to copyright infringement of the TPM-protected work?
Or, alternatively, does Article 11 require WCT Contracting Parties to
grant absolute protection against circumvention of TPMs even if a
TPM restricts acts that would not be copyright infringement or is used
on material not subject to copyright?
benefits .
21 See BASIC PROPOSAL, supra note 7, 10.14:
The expression "communication to the public" of a work means making a work
available to the public by any means or process other than by distributing copies.
This includes communication by wire or wireless means. The technology used may
be analog or digital, and it may be based on electromagnetic waves or guided optical
beams. The use of the non-restrictive term "any" in front of the word
"communication" in Article 10, and in certain provisions of the Berne Convention,
emphasizes the breadth of the act of communication. "Communication" implies
transmission to a public not present in the place where the communication originates.
Communication of a work can involve a series of acts of transmission and temporary
storage, such incidental storage being a necessary feature of the communication
process. If, at any point, the stored work is made available to the public, such making
available constitutes a further act of communication which requires authorization. It
should be noted that storage falls within the scope of the right of reproduction (see
Notes on Article 7).
[Vol. 57:4
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How countries choose to frame legal protection for TPMs on this
dimension has a direct bearing on the viability of existing copyright
exceptions and limitations and national competition policy.
The wording of WCT Article 11 clearly contemplates a nexus
between legal protection for TPMs and copyright law. It requires
WCT Contracting Parties to provide legal protection for TPMs that
are used by authors "in connection with the exercise of their rights
under this treaty or the Berne Convention" and "that restrict acts, in
respect of their works, which are not authorized by the authors
concerned or permitted by law. 22
There is considerable disagreement amongst legal scholars on this
issue also. 23 Paralleling this divergence, there has also been
significant variation in the way that WCT and WPPT Contracting
Parties have chosen to implement these obligations. The U.S. DMCA
does not explicitly require a nexus between legal protection for TPMs
and copyright infringement. However, appellate court decisions have
interpreted the DMCA to require some "nexus" between the
circumvention ban and the possibility of copyright infringement.
24
The European Union's Information Society Directive also does not
appear to require such a nexus, although a recent major review
recommends that the EU regime should be modified to require such a
nexus.25 By comparison, as discussed in further detail below, both the
original Australian and proposed Canadian TPM laws provided legal
protection only to TPMs that had such a nexus with copyright
26infringement.
22 WCT, supra note 4, art. 11.
23 FICSOR, supra note 7, § CI 1.09-.10.
24 Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware Engineering, No. Civ.A. 02-
12102RWZ, 2004 WL 1497688 (D. Mass July 2, 2004), vacated, 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir.
2005); The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
25 INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, STUDY ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECT IN MEMBER STATES' LAWS OF DIRECTIVE 2001/29/EC ON THE
HARMONISATION OF CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS IN THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 97, 102-133 (Feb. 2007) available at http://ec.europa.eu/intemal-
market/copyright/docs/studies/infosoc-study-en.pdf [hereinafter IViR Study].
26 This was the interpretation of former section 116A of the Australian Copyright Act
favored by the Australian High Court in Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't,
[2005] HCA 58 (Austi.). The original draft Australian legislation was even more explicit on this
point. See Kimberlee Weatherall, On Technology Locks and the Proper Scope of Digital
Copyright Laws-Sony in the High Court, 26 SYDNEY L.R. 618-620; 629-636, (2004)
(discussing Digital Agenda, supra note 14, Exposure Draft, Item 14 (Feb. 1999), focused on
technological protection measures which 'prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright
subsisting in any work or other subject-matter' and Digital Agenda, supra note 14, Exposure
Draft, Items 85, 88 (Feb. 1999), which required that a seller of circumvention devices knew, or
was reckless as to whether, the device would be used for the purpose of infringing copyright);
see also Canadian Copyright Bill, C-60, § 34.02(1) (proposed June 2005) (prohibiting
circumvention "for the purpose of an act that is an infringement of copyright.").
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D. Relationship Between TPM law and Copyright Exceptions and
Limitations
Fourth, WCT Contracting Parties have various policy choices
about how to structure legal protection for TPMs in order to
accommodate existing exceptions and limitations in national
copyright law, and to permit the creation of appropriate new
exceptions and limitations as envisaged by Article 10 of the WCT .
Overbroad legal protection for TPMs has the ability to override all
pre-existing exceptions and limitations in national copyright law, and
to preclude the effective creation of new exceptions and limitations to
meet identified domestic policy goals. Thus, in the absence of a clear
nexus requirement between legal protection against TPM
circumvention and copyright infringement, pre-existing copyright law
exceptions and limitations will have no force unless they are
specifically recited as exceptions to the circumvention ban, or the law
imposes an affirmative obligation on rightsholders and TPM
purveyors to provide effective means of exercising exceptions and
limitations to the beneficiaries of those exceptions and limitations.
28
E. Penalties and Remedies
Finally, Article 11 of the WCT gives Contracting Parties much
leeway in how they structure penalties and enforcement mechanisms.
Countries can choose to impose civil or criminal measures, and to
provide lesser penalties or complete exemptions to foster certain
activities and protect particular classes of users. For instance,
countries can choose to provide exemptions from criminal liability
and reduced civil penalties for innocent infringers, where a person
was not aware and had no reason to believe that he or she had
committed a violation. 29 Limiting criminal and monetary liability can
27 Article 10 permits WCT Contracting Parties to create new exceptions and limitations
that meet the Three Step Test. The Agreed Statement to Article 10 of the WCT clarifies that
Member States would have the ability to create new exceptions and limitations appropriate to
the digital networked environment:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry
forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and
exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the
Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in
the digital network environment.
28 See, e.g., EC/2001/29, art. 6(4), infra notes 71-72 (providing a limited and conditional
obligation for certain types of exceptions, but not for works made available interactively online).
29 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(5), 1203(5), 1204; see also Gwen Hinze, Seven Lessons
from a Comparison of the Technological Protection Measure Provisions of the FTAA, the
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also assist in mitigating some of the chilling effect of circumvention
bans on scientific research and provide appropriate incentives for
educational purposes.
II. GLOBAL TPM LAWS
Both Article 11 of the WCT and Article 18 of the WPPT give
Contracting Parties considerable flexibility in how they choose to
frame legal protection for TPMs.
However, despite the range of policy choices open to countries,
broader political considerations, particularly in the international trade
context, have led to convergence around three main implementation
models over the last ten years:
30
(1) The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
which has propagated outside the U.S. through bilateral free
trade agreements, the last nine of which have required trading
partners to adopt TPM laws mirroring the DMCA 31;
DMCA, and Recent Bilateral Free Trade Agreements (November 2003), available at
http://www.eff.org/IP/FTAA/tpm-implementation.pdf; Gwen Hinze, EFF Briefing Paper on
U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Analysis of Implementation of Exceptions and Limitations
(Aug. 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/FrAA/20040830_uschile fta.pdf.
30 Apart from the convergence resulting from recent U.S. bilateral free trade agreements,
countries that have released draft legislation that would have implemented the WIPO Treaties'
TPM obligations in ways that differed from the approach in the DMCA have been the subject of
adverse comment in the United States' Special 301 annual trade report process. For instance, in
2006 Canada was subject to Out-of-Cycle review after it released draft copyright amendment
legislation (Canadian Copyright Bill, supra note 26) implementing its WCT TPM obligations in
a manner that differed in approach from the DMCA by adopting a ban on only the act of
circumvention of a TPM. The 2006 Special 301 report issued by the Office of the United States
Trade Representative stated that:
The United States will use the Out-of-Cycle review to monitor Canada's progress in
providing an adequate and effective IPR protection regime that is consistent with its
international obligations and its advanced level of economic development, including
improved border enforcement, ratification and implementation of the WIPO Internet
Treaties, and strong data protection.
See 2006 Special 301 Report: Canada, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
Document._Library/ReportsPublications/2006/2006_Special_301 _Review/asset-upload-file47
3_9336.pdf
The International Intellectual Property Alliance recommended that Canada stay on the
Priority Watch List in its 2007 Submission to the United States Trade Representative for its
failure to implement the WCT and WPPT with the particular legal regime used in the DMCA.
See 2007 Special 301 Report: Canada, available at http://www.iipa.com/rbcl2007/
2007SPEC301CANADA.pdf. Similarly, New Zealand was the subject of a Special Mention in
the 2007 IPA Submission to the USTR because the TPM provisions in its draft Copyright (New
Technologies and Performers' Rights) Amendment Bill of 2006 differed from the DMCA
approach. See 2007 Special 301 Report: Submission, available at http://www.iipa.com
2007_SPEC30 l_TOC.htm.
31 The last nine bilateral free trade agreements entered into by the U.S. since 2002 have
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(2) The 2001 EU Directive on Harmonising Copyright in the
Information Society, now implemented in the 27 EU Member
States; and
(3) The WIPO "Model Copyright Law," which has recently
been adopted in countries in Africa and the Carribbean as a
part of the WIPO Technical Assistance program.
Parts Two and Three of this paper review those TPM regimes, and
contrast features of the alternative approach taken in the Australian
TPM legislation.
A. United States of America-Digital Millennium Copyright Act
1. Type of Ban
The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA)
takes a maximalist position on all five dimensions of protection
described above. In the Congressional debates leading up to
enactment of the DMCA, its proponents acknowledged that the
DMCA provisions went beyond what was required to comply with
32the U.S.'s WIPO Treaty obligations. First, the DMCA bans both the
act of circumvention of a TPM that controls access to a copyrighted
work33 and also the manufacture, sale, distribution, offering and
required America's trading partners to accede to the WCT and to adopt TPM legal regimes
modeled on the DMCA: Singapore (Article 16.4(7)), Chile (Article 17.7(5)), Morocco (Article
15.5(8)), Australia (Article 17.4(7)), CAFTA (Article 15.5(7)), Bahrain (Article 14.4(7)), Oman
(Article 15.4(7)), Peru (Article 16.7(4)(c)) and Colombia (Article 16.7(4)(c)). The FTAs have
also required trading partners to treat temporary and transient reproductions of digital copyright
works as actionable copyright infringement. Obtaining international adoption of these two sets
of provisions is a key part of the intellectual property trade agenda of U.S. rightsholder industry
groups. The temporary reproduction provision has been used to justify the adoption of access
control TPM circumvention bans in the U.S. legal regime, even though it is arguably
inconsistent with recent developments in U.S. domestic law. See, e.g., Band & Marcinko, supra
note 19.
32 The U.S.'s chief policy spokesperson and proponent of the DMCA, Assistant Secretary
of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, Bruce A. Lehman, admitted during
his congressional testimony in the debates leading to the passage of the DMCA that the U.S.
anti-circumvention provisions went beyond the requirements of the WCT and WPPT. See WIPO
Copyright Treaties Implementation Act and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing
on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop., 105th
Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1997) (testimony of Asst. Sec. of Commerce and Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks Bruce A. Lehman); see also Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the
Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 519, 521, 531-32 (1999), available at http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/-pam/
papers.html (explaining that existing U.S. law satisfied WIPO treaty obligations).
33 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l).
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trafficking in tools, technologies and devices that can be used to
circumvent access control TPMs and copy control TPMs. Second, the
DMCA extends legal protection to access control TPMs, as well as
TPMs that effectively protect a right of a copyright owner (copy
control TPMs).34
2. Scope of Ban
Third, the DMCA provisions have been seen by some as not
requiring an explicit link between legal protection of TPMs and
copyright infringement, even though the provisions refer to use of
TPMs on "works protected under this title," meaning Title 17 of the
United States Code-the U.S. Copyright statute. An early set of
DMCA cases described the TPM provisions as "para-copyright" to
which normal copyright defenses did not apply.35 More recently,
however, U.S. court decisions have read the anti-circumvention
provisions to require a "nexus" between the ban on circumvention or
circumvention devices and copyright infringement. On that view,
TPMs are not entitled to legal protection against circumvention unless
the circumvention of the relevant TPM could lead to copyright
infringement.36 The precise boundaries of the required "nexus,"
however, have not been entirely clarified by the courts, leaving some
uncertainty about whether circumvention will be permitted in order to
enable all legally permitted non-infringing uses, or simply some
subset thereof.
The DMCA requires protection of "effective technological
measures" but does not define that term. Instead, it defines the phrase
"to circumvent a technological measure" and when a TPM can be said
to "effectively control access to a work." Each of those terms is
defined by reference to "authority of the copyright owner." Section
1201(3) provides that:
As used in this subsection-
34 It provides greater protection against circumvention of access control TPMs than copy
control TPMs. The DMCA bans both the act of circumventing an access control TPM and
access control circumvention devices. while the DMCA bans manufacture and distribution of
copy control circumvention tools, the DMCA does not include a corresponding ban on the act of
circumventing a copy control TPM.
35 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 11l F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff'd sub nom Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley et al., 273 F. 3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001).
36 Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware Engineering, 2004 WL 1497688
(D. Mass July 2, 2004), vacated, 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2005); The Chamberlain Group, Inc.
v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
2007]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
(A) to "circumvent a technological measure" means
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an
encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass,
remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright
owner; and
(B) a technological measure "effectively controls
access to a work" if the measure, in the ordinary
course of its operation, requires the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the
authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the
work.37
Recent case law has clarified that certain TPMs are not given legal
protection. TPMs that provide an alternative means of access to a
work do not "effectively control access to a work" and are not
protected. In Lexmark v. Static Control,38 the Sixth Circuit denied
legal protection to a non-encrypted authentication sequence on a
computer program that read the level of printer toner in certain
Lexmark laser printers and stated that:
Just as one would not say that a lock on the back door of a
house "controls access" to a house whose front door does not
contain a lock and just as one would not say that a lock on
any door of a house controls access to the home after its
purchaser receives the key to the lock, it does not make sense
to say that the DMCA's ban on distributing access controls
applies to otherwise readily accessible copyrighted works.39
3. Exceptions and Limitations
The DMCA does not specifically accommodate pre-existing
exceptions and limitations to U.S. copyright law. Instead, it
enumerates seven specific exceptions to the circumvention act ban for
socially beneficial purposes including reverse engineering to create
interoperable programs, cryptography research, and computer security
research.4° There are exceptions for access control tools for five of
those seven activities, and exceptions for manufacturing and
distributing copyright control tools for two of the seven. Apart from
17 U.S.C. § 1201(3).
3 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
'9 Id. at 547.
17 U.S.C. §1201(d)-O).
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the seven specified exceptions, U.S. Copyright law also permits
circumvention of protected copies of sound recordings for
webcasting. 41 The DMCA also contains an important "no mandate"
limitation, which makes it clear that technologists do not have to
design their technologies to respond to particular TPMs used by
rightsholders.42 This is crucial for technological innovation and
competition. At the time that the DMCA was debated, the U.S.
consumer electronics industry feared that without such a provision,
rightholders could use TPMs on content to control the design of
technologies that interoperated with their content. Finally, the DMCA
includes a process by which the Librarian of Congress, on the
recommendation of the Register of Copyrights, can grant limited
three year exemptions to the act ban for particular classes of works.
4. Penalties
The DMCA has both civil fines and criminal penalties, including
up to five years' imprisonment for willful circumvention done for
commercial advantage or private financial gain. It provides for
statutory pre-established, per-violation damages, which can be
remitted where a person was not aware and had no reason to believe
that he or she had committed a violation.43 The DMCA allows for
exemptions from criminal liability for non-profit libraries, archives,
educational institutions and public broadcasting entities,44 and allows
a court to remit damages for those entities if they were not aware and
had no reason to believe their acts constituted a violation.45
B. Impact of the DMCA
Over the last seven years, the DMCA's legal framework has
proven to be overbroad. Its provisions have been used in ways that
have nothing to do with stopping copyright infringement, but have
caused collateral damage to a wide range of legitimate activities.
In practice, the DMCA regime has resulted in at least four sets of
unintended (and in some cases, intended) consequences:
0 It has overridden copyright exceptions and
limitations in U.S. law;
41 17 U.S.C. § 112(a)(2) allows "exempt" webcasters to circumvent a TPM to make a
copy of a protected work for webcasting. Section 113(e)(8) has a similar exception for
webcasters subject to the statutory licence regime.
42 17 U.S.C. §1201 (c)(3).
43 17 U.S.C. §1201(5)(A).
- 17 U.S.C. § 1204.
45 17 U.S.C. § 1203(5)(B).
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* It has been misused to block competition and harm
consumers;
* It has allowed rightsholders to control the pace and
nature of technological innovation; and
* It has chilled scientific research and publication.
The following section examines the features of the DMCA that
caused this, and provides a roadmap for how to structure a TPM legal
regime to do less harm to the public interest and preserve space for
national competition policy.
1. Overbroad TPM Laws Can Override Exceptions and Limitations in
Copyright Law
Digital rights management technologies can be used to prevent all
uses of copyrighted works, including uses that would be permitted
under exceptions and limitations in copyright law. They can also be
used to block access to material in which copyright no longer exists,
or which is uncopyrightable. In effect, the DMCA has allowed
copyright owners to use a TPM backed by legal sanctions to
unilaterally redraw the copyright balance.
At the global level, the DMCA regime allows U.S. copyright
owners' wishes about use of their work to trump national copyright
law exceptions that otherwise would allow access to and use of a
work. This is likely to have an adverse impact on countries'
sovereignty. The scope of legal protection given to rightholders'
TPMs is therefore crucial for maintaining the traditional balance
embodied in copyright law.
Unfortunately, a series of early cases interpreted the DMCA
provisions as creating a new exclusive right to control access to
copyrighted works, beyond the scope of traditional copyright law.
46
On that view, circumvention of a technological protection measure is
banned even if the intended use of a technologically-protected work
would not be copyright infringement. As a result, the DMCA has
overridden existing statutory exceptions in U.S. copyright law for
educational and other uses, and effectively eliminated consumers'
4 See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), affd sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley et al., 273 F. 3d 429 (2nd Cir.
2001); U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Paramount Pictures Corp. v.
Tritton Technologies Inc., No. CV 03-7316 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept.17, 2003); 321 Studios v.
MGM, 307 F. Supp.2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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ability to make "fair use"-unauthorized, but lawful, uses of
protected digital media that they have purchased.
During the debates leading up to enactment of the DMCA,
members of the U.S. Congress had expressed concern that the DMCA
could have this impact. For this reason, the DMCA includes several
mechanisms intended to protect fair and other non-infringing uses.
First, it contains a clear statement of legislative intent to preserve fair
use. 17 U.S.C. 1201(c)(1) provides:
Nothing in this section shall affect rights, remedies,
limitations, or defenses to copyright infringement, including
fair use, under this title.
This was intended to clarify that consumers could make fair use of
digital works to which they had lawful access. Second, the DMCA
does not contain a ban on the act of circumventing copy control
TPMs.
In practice, these provisions have been meaningless because the
DMCA bans the circumvention tools that would be needed by
non-technologically sophisticated users to make non-copyright
infringing uses. The early series of DMCA cases concerning DVD
decryption software made it clear that if circumvention software falls
within one of the DMCA's tools ban, the fact that it can be used to
make downstream fair use and other lawful uses is no defense to the
circumvention device ban. Thus, even if making a personal back up
copy of one of your DVDs were considered fair use, there would be
no tools available to enable this activity.
The DMCA contains a third mechanism designed to protect lawful
use-the triennial rulemaking process permitting the Librarian of
Congress to grant three yearly exemptions to the ban on the act of
circumventing a TPM. Congress intended this to be a fail-safe
mechanism to monitor and protect consumers' non-infringing uses
from inappropriate encroachment by TPMs. However, it has not been
effective at doing so for three reasons. First, and most fundamentally,
the exemption does not extend to legalizing the tools that would be
necessary to make use of any particular exemption granted.
Unfortunately, for the vast majority of non-technologically
sophisticated users who cannot create their own circumvention tools,
this makes the exemption process meaningless. Second, the
rulemaking is governed by technical rules and procedural burdens that
have made it practically impossible for consumers to participate
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without engaging lawyers to frame their submissions.47 Third,
because the process takes place only once every three years, it is
unable to keep pace with the technical developments that encroach
upon fair and other lawful uses.
Perhaps the clearest demonstration of the DMCA's overriding
impact on existing copyright law exceptions and limitations concerns
the visually disabled community. U.S. copyright law has a statutory
exception permitting non-profit organizations to create Braille or
other alternative translations of books for the blind. The operation of
this provision is well understood in the analogue book world.
However, that is not true for electronic books, which often are
released by publishers with technological protection measures that
may restrict uses such as the number of copies that may be made, the
device upon which an eBook might be read, and whether an eBook
could be printed, or read aloud by text to speech conversion software.
Because this copyright law exception is not expressly recited as an
exception to the DMCA bans, it is not possible to circumvent
technologically protected eBooks for this purpose. As a result, the
American Federation of the Blind sought exemptions in the 2003 and
2006 rulemakings to allow blind persons to circumvent to use text to
speech software for technologically-protected eBooks.48 Even though
three yearly exemptions to the ban on the act of circumventing an
access control TPM were granted in the DMCA rulemaking process,
this did not legalize creation and distribution of the tools needed to
utilize the exemptions.
In addition to the DMCA's impact on copyright exceptions,
overbroad TPM regimes and obsolescent DRM technologies pose a
47 EFF, THE DMCA TRIENNIAL RULEMAKING; FAILING THE DIGrrAL CONSUMER, (Dec.
2006), http://www.eff.org/EP/DMCA/copyrightoffice/DMCAmulemaking-broken.pdf.
48 See Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2006) (2006 Comments of the American
Foundation for the Blind), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/
comments/discipio afb.pdf; 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2006 Testimony of the American Foundation for
the Blind), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/hearings/transcript-mar29.pdf.
Determination of the Librarian of Congress, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006) (including the
following exemption: "Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook
editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities)
contain access controls that prevent the enabling either of the book's read-aloud function or of
screen readers that render the text into a specialized format."); see also Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control
Technologies, 37 C.F.R. § 201 (2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/l201/2003/
comments/026.pdf; Determination of the Librarian of Congress; 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011 (Oct. 31,
2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2003/68fr20ll.pdf (including a
three-year exemption for: "Literary works distributed in ebook format when all existing ebook
editions of the work (including digital text editions made available by authorized entities)
contain access controls that prevent the enabling of the ebook's read-aloud function and that
prevent the enabling of screen readers to render the text into a specialized format.")
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serious threat to the public's right of access to works that are no
longer protected under copyright. The problem is part technical, part
legal. Digital rights management technologies do not cease to
function when copyright expires in a protected work. The DMCA
does not contain an express limitation for public domain and
uncopyrightable works, nor does it expressly and affirmatively permit
circumvention or provide a means of accessing circumvention tools
where copyright term has expired on a TPM-protected work.
Libraries, archives and public interest organizations have been
concerned for some time that legally-enforced DRM that becomes
obsolescent may block the public's statutory right to access public
domain material that is in the collection of libraries and archives.49
Library associations, the Internet Archive and public interest
organizations sought exemptions in the DMCA rulemakings in 2000,
2003 and 2006.'o The U.S. Librarian of Congress granted an
exemption for 2000-2003 for "Literary works, including computer
programs and databases, protected by access control mechanisms that
fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage or
obsoleteness," and exemptions for 2003-2006 for "Computer
programs protected by dongles that prevent access due to malfunction
or damage and which are obsolete" and "Computer programs and
video games distributed in formats that have become obsolete and
which require the original media or hardware as a condition of
access" and a renewal of that exemption in 2006.51 However, the
Librarian of Congress declined to grant a circumvention exemption in
the 2003 rulemaking for access to public domain movies released on
DVD. 2
Obsolescence is likely to be an ongoing concern as copyrighted
works are increasingly made available only in technologically
protected digital formats. Unfortunately, the DMCA regime is
structurally ill-equipped to handle this issue. Even if consumers were
able to act collectively and overcome the procedural burdens required
to engage successfully in the triennial exemption rulemaking (which
does not appear likely based on previous experience), that process is
only able to provide time-limited, piecemeal relief. Most importantly,
49 See the submission made by LACA, the Libraries and Archives Copyright Alliance, and
the British Library's evidence to the U.K. All Party Parliamentary Internet Group (APIG)
Inquiry into Digital Rights Management.
50 See Recommendation of Copyright Register and Determination of Librarian of
Congress, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555 (Oct. 27, 2000), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/
docs/registers-recommendation.pdf; Determination of Librarian of Congress, 68 Fed. Reg.
62,011 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.copyright.gov/fedreg/2003/68fr201l.html.
51 Id.
52 68 Fed. Reg. 62,011, 62,015; 2003 Recommendation of Register of Copyrights, at 99.
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the DMCA process lacks a mechanism permitting consumers to
access the circumvention tools and services necessary to utilize any
exemption granted.
These issues could be addressed by modifications to the current
U.S. TPM legal regime. For instance, an express provision could be
inserted to ensure that expiry of the copyright term on a
technologically protected work provides a complete defence to the act
of circumventing a technological protection measure. However, in
order to be effective, this will also require lawful availability of
circumvention tools. To preserve access for lawful non-infringing
uses of copyrighted works and to protect access to public domain
material located on TPM-protected formats in combination with
copyrighted works, a simple and expeditious administrative procedure
could be established for information users to petition to import and
use necessary circumvention tools for this purpose. This could be
done by creating an administrative procedure similar to that in former
section 116A of the Australian Copyright Act of 1968 (discussed
below).
Alternatively, access could be provided on a more limited scale for
particular classes of users, such as libraries and archives. The DMCA
could be amended to provide a complete defense for manufacture and
supply of circumvention technologies to libraries and archives, or it
could place the burden on rightsholders by requiring content
producers to provide either the relevant DRM keys or decryption
information to deposit libraries at the time a work is added to a library
or archive collection, or to provide libraries and archives with a non
technologically-protected "clean" copy of the digital work. This could
enable libraries and archives to undertake digital preservation of
cultural assets, and permit such institutions, as intermediaries, to
make accessible copies available to information users and/or disabled
people, to avail themselves of the statutory exceptions and limitations
to copyright, albeit in a somewhat mediated fashion.53
53 See EFF Submission to the United Kingdom's H.M.Treasury's Gowers Review of U.K.
Intellectual Property Law, April 2006, available at http://www.eff.org/global/uk/EFFGowers_
submission.pdf [hereinafter EFF Submission]; see also Sections 49 and 50 of the Australian
Copyright Act of 1968, which permit libraries, archives and cultural institutions to reproduce
and communicate works to make them available to users for research and study purposes and to
other libraries and archives, and Recommendation 25 of the report of the Australian Parliament
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs on the
Review of Technological Protection Measure Exceptions, which recommended permitting
circumvention by libraries, archives and cultural institutions for these purposes.
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2. Anti-Competitive Misuse
U.S. copyright owners have used TPMs backed by the DMCA to
obtain new monopolies over non-copyrightable products and
technologies that interoperate with their copyrighted works. This has
had anti-competitive impacts for consumers, and prevented the
creation of new interoperable technologies.
The DMCA has been used in efforts to lock consumers into
purchasing proprietary monopoly-priced products and to prevent the
development of legitimate aftermarkets. For instance, Lexmark, the
second largest printer distributor in the U.S., has tried to use the
DMCA to block the creation of an aftermarket in recycled printer
cartridges that were being sold to consumers at a lower price than
Lexmark's own authorized refilled cartridges.54 A garage door
manufacturer, Chamberlain Group, has tried to use the DMCA to ban
the sale of its competitor's universal garage remote control opener.
A telecommunications company has used the DMCA to block cell
phone unlocking services, and a proprietary data storage company
used the DMCA to ban its customers' use of an independent computer
maintenance service.56
Each of these cases turned on particular features of the DMCA.
First, the definition of circumvention of a TPM framed by reference
to "authority of a copyright owner" (see above), and second, the
unclarity (now largely resolved) about whether the DMCA requires
an explicit nexus between legal protection for TPMs and the
possibility of copyright infringement. While the above cases were
resolved on appeal in favor of the legitimate aftermarket parties, the
courts' decisions were based on very fact-specific analysis.
Accordingly, it would be premature to conclude that these court
rulings will stop a more determined rightsholder from making future
anti-competitive misuse of the DMCA.
This is a fundamental deficiency in the DMCA's legal framework.
It could be addressed by various means. First, by modifying the
DMCA to require explicit proof that circumventing a particular TPM
54 Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 943
(E.D. Ky. 2003), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
55 The Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies, Inc., No. 02 C 6376 (N.D. Ill.,
2003); aff'd, 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also See Timothy B. Lee, Circumventing
Competition: The Perverse Consequences of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, CATO
Policy Analysis No. 564 (Mar. 21, 2006) http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pub-id=6025.
56 See Storage Technology Corporation v. Custom Hardware Engineering, No. Civ.A. 02-
12102RWZ, 2004 WL 1497688 (D. Mass. July 2, 2004), vacated, 421 F.3d 1307 (Fed. Cit.
2005); TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. SOL Wireless Group, Inc., No. 05-23279-CIV-
Altonaga/Tumoff (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2006).
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will result in copyright infringement in order to obtain legal
protection against circumvention of that TPM. Second, by providing
protection for competition outside of the DMCA's framework.
Establishing a low-barrier administrative process to deal
expeditiously with anti-competitive misuses of the DMCA's
provisions could do this. This could take the form of a modified
version of the administrative process established by the U.K.
implementation of the EU Information Society Directive (see
below).
3. Control Over Pace and Nature of Innovation of Disruptive
Technologies
U.S. motion picture copyright owners have used TPMs backed by
the DMCA together with restrictive licensing terms to obtain control
over the features of the players and devices on which their content
can be played. By doing so, they have obtained control over the pace
and nature of innovation of technologies that could otherwise disrupt
their current business models. While the U.S. Congress did not intend
the DMCA to have this effect, it is now clear that this was one of the
reasons U.S. rightsholders sought legal protection against
circumvention of TPMs. It was the central part of a well-documented
strategy to exert control over the pace and nature of innovation.58
This is particularly clear with respect to DVD players. DVD
players need to have decryption keys, to decrypt one of the
technological measures placed on motion pictures released on
DVDs-the Content Scramble System or CSS. Anyone who wants to
manufacture a DVD player must obtain a licence from the DVD Copy
Control Association in order to obtain the necessary decryption keys
for the device to unlock the CSS on a DVD placed in the player. The
DVD-CCA claims that the CSS encryption technology is a trade
secret. Obtaining access to that proprietary information is the "hook"
by which the DVD-CCA can contractually oblige manufacturers to
design and sell DVD players with particular features.
57 Others have also suggested that this could be dealt with by application of a
reinvigorated copyright misuse doctrine, at least in the United States, which has such a doctrine.
See Dan Burk, Anti-Circumvention Misuse, (Minnesota Public Law Research Paper No. 02-10,
2002), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=320961.
58 See Dean S. Marks & Bruce H. Turnbull, Technical Protection Measures: The
Intersection of Technology, Law and Commercial Licenses, presented at WIPO Workshop on
Implementation Issues of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), December 6-7, 1999, WIPO Doc. WCT-WPPT/IMP/3, available
at http://www.wipo.int/documents/en/meetings/1999/wct-wppt/.
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The DMCA's particular legal framework plays an important role
here. As noted above, the DMCA defines "circumvention" and when
a technological measure "effectively controls access" to a work by
reference to the "authority of the copyright owner.59 U.S. motion
picture rightsholders claim that the only "authorized" DVD players
are those that comply with the DVD Copy Control Association's
license conditions. As a result, a technology innovator that distributes
a DVD player with additional features-such as the ability to skip
through advertisements-something possible on many free and open
source software players-would be unauthorized and violate the
DMCA's device ban, even if use of the movie would not infringe
copyright.
U.S. rightsholders have also used region-coding technologies,
backed by the DMCA and other national TPM laws, to geographically
segment markets for video games (such as the Sony Playstation) and
motion pictures released on DVD. The DVD CCA license requires
DVD manufacturers to ensure that DVD players enforce
region-coding restrictions, and display content from only a single
"home" region. Region coding protects no copyright interest, since
international exhaustion rules could allow consumers to possess and
use lawfully acquired DVDs from other regions. However, despite
that, U.S. rightsholders have claimed, in testimony before the U.S.
Copyright Register, that multi-region DVD players that would allow
consumers to watch DVDs lawfully purchased in another country are
"unauthorized" circumvention devices outlawed by the DMCA, and
that consumers who use such players violate the DMCA's
circumvention act ban.60
Thus, U.S. copyright owners have used the DMCA and the
comparatively weak protection offered by the CSS TPM as a means
of exerting control over the features available in DVD players, and to
block the release of new technologies that would disrupt their existing
business models. The DMCA's legal framework has proven very
effective for this purpose. The same is true for innovation in portable
media players. For example, while consumers can watch movies
purchased from the Apple iTunes store on their Apple Video iPod,
they cannot lawfully rip their own DVD collections to the same iPod.
59 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3).
60 See Testimony of Representatives of MPAA (Steve Metalitz) and AOL./Time Warner
(Dean Marks) Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Public Hearings on Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection for Access Control Technologies, Docket
No. RM 2002-4, May 15, 2003, available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201I2003/
hearings/schedule.html (asserting that multi-region DVD players violate section 1201).
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4. Chilling Effect on Scientific Research and Publication
U.S. copyright owners have also used the DMCA to chill scientific
research and to block publication of research that discusses security
vulnerabilities in protection technologies. There are concerns within
the U.S. that this has weakened computer security, which depends on
research and testing.
In 2001, a music industry group threatened DMCA liability against
a Princeton professor and his research team when they tried to publish
a research paper describing weaknesses in the music industry's
proposed digital watermark technology. 61 The industry group
considered that the information in the paper was a "circumvention
tool" and publishing it was banned under the DMCA. The research
team withdrew their paper after the music industry also sent threat
letters to their employers and the conference organizers. After
Professor Felten and his team filed a lawsuit to clarify their right to
research and publish, the music industry body withdrew its threat.
While the research team was eventually able to publish a vetted
version of its paper after several months of litigation, significant harm
was done. One of the team lost his position and a second decided to
discontinue computer security research as a result of the litigation.
Professor Felten's case has had an ongoing chilling effect on
scientific research and publication. Researchers in the U.S. and
overseas have refused to publish the results of security vulnerability
research or have removed previously published research from the
Internet for fear of DMCA liability. Within the U.S. there is growing
concern about the impact of the DMCA on computer security
research. In 2002, former White House Cyber Security adviser
Richard Clarke admitted that the DMCA had had a chilling effect on
security research and called for DMCA reform.
The importance of ensuring a safe environment for scientific
research into encryption and computer security has been highlighted
by the recent Sony rootkit CD copy-protection scandal. Consumers
became aware during 2005 that Sony BMG had sold audio CDs with
two types of copy protection software that installed itself onto
purchasers' computers as hidden files, and exposed those computers
to security threats. Computer science researchers who discovered the
security flaws delayed releasing their results and raising the alarm for
fear of potential DMCA liability.62
61 For further details, see EFF REPORT, UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: SEVEN YEARS
UNDER THE DMCA (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/
unintended consequences.php.
62 j Alex Halderman & Edward W. Felten, Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode,
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This is a further fundamental shortcoming in the DMCA regime
that requires statutory modification to remedy. This could be done by
incorporating an exception from civil and criminal liability for
circumvention acts and tools for lawful non-infringing uses of
TPM-protected works.
III. ALTERNATIVE TPM LEGAL REGIMES
A. The European Union
The European Union has quite a complex TPM legal regime. At
least three directives govern TPMs on works. Articles 6 and 8 of the
2001 EU Directive on Harmonizing Copyright in the Information
Society (2001/29/EC) were intended to implement the WCT. They
provide the framework for legal protection of TPMs on copyrighted
works that are not computer programs in the EU and its Member
States. The 1991 Computer Programs Directive created legal
protection for technical devices on software,63  and the 1998
Conditional Access directive also regulates DRM on television
delivered via conditional access cable service. 64 This paper focuses on
the 2001 Directive provisions.
1. Type of Ban
Like the DMCA, the EUCD bans both the act of circumventing a
TPM and manufacture, distribution and importation of circumvention
tools. However, the EUCD is both broader, and narrower, than the
DMCA in certain respects. Unlike the DMCA, it bans the act of
available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/pub/sonydrm-ext.pdf; see also Testimony of Prof.
Edward W. Felten, Library of Congress, Copyright Office, Public Hearings on Exemption to
Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection for Access Control Technologies, Docket
No. RM 2005-IIA (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2006/
hearings/transcript-mar31.pdf, (describing ways in which DMCA hindered research into
Sony-BMG CD copy-protection software).
63 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, art. 7(1)(c), which bans the "act of putting into circulation, or the possession for
commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate the
unauthorized removal or circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to
protect a computer program."
64 Directive 98/84/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of November 20,
1998, on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting of, Conditional Access, art. 4
(requiring Member States to prohibit the manufacture, import, distribution, sale, rental or
possession for commercial purposes of "illicit devices" meaning "any equipment or software
designed or adapted to give access to a protected service in an intelligible form without the
authorisation of the service provider"); see also Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in
the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. LAW 323 (2004).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
circumventing both access and copy control TPMs.65 Like the DMCA
it requires Member States to prohibit the manufacture and distribution
of devices that can circumvent both access control and copy control
TPMs.66
2. Scope of Ban
Article 6 does not explicitly require a nexus between
circumvention protection and copyright. Whether such a link is
required has been the subject of much analysis from legal scholars. 67
Reflecting this uncertainty, there are significant differences in the
approach taken by Member States in the implementation of these
provisions in national law. Some have limited legal protection for
TPMs to the scope of national copyright law. Other countries have
not interpreted Article 6(3) in that way, resulting in new bans on
accessing TPM-protected content.
68
3. Exceptions and Limitations
The Information Society Directive includes a special
"countermeasure" provision to accommodate certain copyright
exceptions and limitations, Article 6(4).69 Unlike the DMCA's more
rigid enumerated list of seven specific exceptions, the Directive does
not contain explicit exceptions to the circumvention act and device
bans. Instead Article 6(4) allows EU Member States some flexibility
in creating mechanisms to accommodate a specified sub-set of the
"harmonized" exceptions and limitations that Member States may
choose to include in their national copyright law under Article 5 of
the Directive.70  Article 6(4) creates a limited obligation on
rightsholders and EU Member States to provide the means of making
certain uses of technologically-protected works to beneficiaries of
those copyright exceptions. In addition, Recital 48 clarifies that
65 Information Society Directive, supra note 13, at art. 6(1); 6(3).
66 Id. at art. 6(2) and 6(3).
67 See id. at art. 6(3); IViR Study, supra note 25, at 77 ff (arguing that the Information
Society Directive provides protection beyond the EU's obligations under the WIPO Treaties);
Urs Gasser, Legal Frameworks and Technological Protection of Digital Content: Moving
Forward Towards a Best Practice Model, (Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2006-04,
June 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--908998; Urs Gasser and Michael Girsberger,
Transposing the Copyright Directive: Legal Protection of Technological Measures in
EU-Member States-A Genie Stuck in the Bottle?, (Berkman Working Paper No. 2004-10, Nov.
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=628007; Stefan Bechtold, Commentary on Article 6
in THOMAS DREIER & BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW (Kluwer
Law International, 2006).
68 See IViR Study, supra note 25 and Gasser, supra note 67.
69 See Information Society Directive, supra note 13, at art. 6(4).
7 id.
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Article 6 imposes no obligation to design devices and services to
correspond to particular TPMs so long as they do not fall within the
device ban.
The concept of an affirmative countermeasure that puts the onus
on rightsholders to make sure that users can continue to exercise
copyright exceptions in respect of technologically-protected works is
laudable from a public policy perspective It offers the possibility of
avoiding many of the pitfalls experienced under the U.S. DMCA
regime, and places the costs of facilitation on the party most able to
bear them. However, on closer examination, the countermeasure
provision in Article 6(4) offers less assistance than first appearances
suggest.
First, Article 6(4) only applies to a limited subset of the possible
harmonized exceptions available to EU Member States under Article
5 of the Directive, and not to the full range of statutory exceptions
that might exist in national law.7' Second, it applies only to the ban on
the act of circumvention, and not to manufacture or provision of
circumvention devices and services that an average consumer might
need to circumvent a TPM.72 Even then, it only applies to
circumvention of copy control TPMs once lawful access has been
obtained, and so not to access control TPMs.73
Third, Article 6(4) is conditional. It assumes that rightsholders will
voluntarily take measures to make available the means of utilizing
privileged exceptions to beneficiaries, and does not require Member
States to take action to ensure that beneficiaries can do so, unless
rightsholders fail to do so within "a reasonable time., 74 Most
importantly, the obligation to provide the means of exercising
exceptions has a major carve-out that arguably makes the whole
countermeasure framework of little practical relevance to the digital
environment.75 It does not apply to content that is made available
interactively on the Internet subject to a contract or license agreement.
71 Id. Article 6(4) requires Member States to take measures in respect of the "public
policy" set of permissible exceptions: acts of reproduction using reprographic equipment
(Article 5(2)(a)); acts of reproduction by publicly accessible libraries, educational institutions,
libraries and archives (Article 5(2)(c)); ephemeral recordings of works made by broadcasting
organizations (Article 5(2)(d)); reproductions of broadcasts by certain non-commercial
institutions (prisons, etc) (Article 5(2)(e)); use for the sole purpose of illustration for teaching or
scientific research (Article 5(3)(a)); and use for the disabled (Article 5(3)(b)). By comparison,
for the private copy exception, (Article 5(2)(b)) it permits, but does not require Members States
to take action. Id.
72 Article 6(4) of the Information Society Directive provides: "Notwithstanding the legal
protection provided for in paragraph 1."
73 IViR Study, supra note 25, at 109.
74 Information Society Directive, supra note 13, Recital 41.
75 Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid,
available at http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/opinion-EIPR.html.
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Leaving aside this exclusion and the limitations on the mechanism,
the Article 6(4) framework gives EU Member States significant
flexibility as to how they implement this provision. EU Member
States have followed four main approaches: some countries have
created a right of self help that entitles exception beneficiaries to
circumvent; a second set of countries have created an arbitration
proceeding; a third set of countries have created a direct right of
action to enforce privileged exceptions in a court of law; and a fourth
set of countries have created an administrative or executive authority
to regulate the use of TPMs.7 6 For instance, the U.K. implementation
of this provision of the Information Society Directive involves an
administrative procedure. Where a TPM prevents a person from
carrying out a "permitted act," the person can issue a notice of
complaint to the U.K. Secretary of State, who must then initiate an
investigation to determine "whether any voluntary measure or
agreement relevant to the copyright work the subject of the complaint
subsists. 77 If the Secretary of State determines that no voluntary
measure or agreement exists, he or she may order the rightsholder to
ensure that the complainant can benefit from the permitted act under
U.K. copyright law. Failure to comply with the direction is treated as
a breach of statutory duty, and permits action to be taken by the
complainant or a representative body.78 As currently established, the
U.K. procedure does not specifically deal with potential
anti-competitive misuses of TPMs. However, a modified version of
this procedure might be able to do so, and in conjunction with
reduced penalties, would go a long way to reducing the chill of
anti-circumvention bans.79
76 Gasser, supra note 67; IViR Study, supra note 25, at 126 ff.
77 Section 296ZE of the U.K. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988, amended by
Copyright and Related Rights Regulations of 2003; see also Ian Brown, Implementing the EU
Copyright Directive, in FOUNDATION FOR INFORMATION POLICY RESEARCH REPORT 123,
available at http://www.fipr.org/copyright/guide/eucd-suide.pdf; Gasser, supra note 67, at 27;
LViR Study, supra note 25, at 128-29.
78 Section 296ZE(5), supra note 77.
79 Id.; see also EFF Submission, supra note 53, at 10:
[U]pon receipt of a credible allegation of anti-competitive use, the Secretary of
State should be required to undertake a factual inquiry and make a speedy
determination about whether the TPM is being used in a way that appears to violate
national competition policies. Once a credible allegation of anti-competitive use has
been made, the burden of proof should shift to the entity using the TPM to provide
evidence to the Secretary of State to the contrary.
A provision should be included in sections 296-296ZF of the CDPA removing
legal protection against circumvention of rightsholders' technological measures
where there is a judicial determination that those TPMs are being used in a way that
violates U.K. competition policies. The provision should also provide a conditional
defence and significantly reduced penalties for circumvention of a TPM where the
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How effective each of these processes can be at achieving the
desired end of preserving exceptions depends on the burden they
place on exception beneficiaries, and the fairness of the procedural
rules involved. Requiring exception beneficiaries to go to court to
enforce an exception obviously puts the cost of enforcement of
exceptions on users, rather than rightsholders. Similarly, an
administrative process that puts significant obstacles in the way of
users seeking to utilize exceptions will result in recalibration of the
copyright balance in favor of rightsholders that use TPMs at the
expense of copyright users. However, an appropriately balanced
administrative procedure that gives copyright users an expeditious
way of accessing technologically-protected works for non-infringing
purposes, that, unlike current Article 6(4), covers both circumvention
acts and tools, and that provides a mechanism for dealing with
potentially anti-competitive misuses of TPMs, could serve the
interests of both copyright owners and the copyright users
community.
4. Penalties
Article 8 of the Directive requires Member States to provide
appropriate remedies and sanctions that are "effective, proportionate
and dissuasive," including actions for damages and injunctions, and
provision for seizure of infringing material and circumvention
devices. 80
B. WIPO Model Copyright Law
In recent years, as part of the WIPO Technical Assistance
program, WIPO has provided recommendations on draft legislative
provisions to Member States that have sought advice on how to
implement their WCT and WPPT obligations. As a result of these
efforts, the WIPO Model Law provisions concerning TPMs have been
adopted in a number of countries in Africa and the Caribbean, and
now form the third major model for TPM legal regimes.
defendant has acted on a good faith belief that the TPM is being used in an unlawful,
anti-competitive fashion. In particular, in order to dispel any chill on legitimate
competitors, remedies should be restricted to injunctive relief, demonstrated damages
suffered by the plaintiff, or similar relief, rather than prescribed per-piece statutory
damages, retroactive royalties, or criminal penalty.
go Information Society Directive, supra note 13, at art. 8.
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Article 30 of the Enforcement Chapter of the WIPO Draft Law of
Copyright and Related Rights (2005) provides as follows:
8 1
30.(1) The following acts shall be considered unlawful and,
in the application of Sections 27 to 29, shall be assimilated to
infringements of the rights protected under this Law:
(i) the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of
any device or means specifically designed or adapted
to circumvent any device or means intended to
prevent or restrict reproduction of a work, a
phonogram or a broadcast, or to impair the quality of
copies made;
(ii) the manufacture or importation for sale or rental
of any device or means that is susceptible to enable
or assist the reception of an encrypted program,
which is broadcast or otherwise communicated to the
public, including by satellite, by those who are not
entitled to receive the program;
(iii) the removal or alteration of any electronic rights
management information without authority;
(iv) the distribution, import for distribution,
broadcasting, communication to the public or making
available to the public, without authority, of works,
performances, phonograms or broadcasts, knowing or
having reason to know that electronic rights
management information has been removed or
altered without authority.
81 WIPO Draft Law of Copyright and Related Rights (2005 version) (on file with the
author), derived from the 1976 Tunis Model Law developed jointly by the WIPO Committee of
Experts and UNESCO, cited in FICSOR, supra note 7, l.16-1.17. The WIPO Draft Copyright
Law was previously available on the WIPO website, but no longer appears to be so. Footnote 57
to the Draft Copyright Law states that: "These provisions are currently being updated." And
continues:
This category of enforcement provisions is of particular importance in relation to
digital technologies. In certain cases, the only practical means of preventing copying
is through so-called "copy-protection" or "copy-management" systems, which
contain technical devices that either prevent entirely the making of copies, or make
the quality of the copies so poor that they are unusable. Technical devices are also
used in decoders or in systems of access control. However, it is technically possible
to manufacture devices by means of which these systems may be circumvented. The
manufacture, importation and distribution of such devices should be considered
infringements of copyright to be sanctioned in the same way as other violations.
[Vol. 57:4
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(3) In the application of Sections 27 to 29, any illicit device
and means mentioned in paragraph (1) and any copy from
which rights management information has been removed, or
in which such information has been altered, shall be
assimilated to infringing copies of works, and any illicit act
referred to in subsection (1) of this Section shall be treated as
an infringement of copyright or related rights to which the
civil remedies and criminal sanctions provided for in Sections
27 to 29 are applicable.82
1. Type of Ban
The WIPO provision prohibits circumvention devices and services,
but not the act of circumvention per se. Although the provision does
not refer to "access control TPMs" or "copy control TPMs" by name,
the provision would clearly apply to copy control TPMs.83 The phrase
"prevent or restrict reproduction" of a work could also be construed to
82 The equivalent provision in the alternative WIPO Draft Law of Copyright and Related
Rights for civil law countries provides as follows:
29.(1) The following acts shall be considered unlawful and, in the application of
Sections 26 to 28, shall be assimilated to infringements of the rights protected under
this Law:
(i) the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of any device or
means specifically designed or adapted to circumvent any device or
means intended to prevent or restrict reproduction of a work, a
phonogram or a broadcast, or to impair the quality of copies made;
(ii) the manufacture or importation for sale or rental of any device or
means that is susceptible to enable or assist the reception of an encrypted
program, which is broadcast or otherwise communicated to the public,
including by satellite, by those who are not entitled to receive the
program;
(iii)the removal or alteration of any electronic rights management
information without authority;
(iv) the distribution, import for distribution, broadcasting, communication
to the public or making available to the public, without authority, of
works, performances, phonograms or broadcasts, knowing or having
reason to know that electronic rights management information has been
removed or altered without authority.
(2) In the application of Sections 26 to 28, any illicit device and means mentioned in
paragraph (1) and any copy from which rights management information has been
removed, or in which such information has been altered, shall be assimilated to
infringing copies of works, and any illicit act referred to in subsection (1) of this
Section shall be treated as an infringement of copyright or related rights to which the
civil remedies and criminal sanctions provided for in Sections 26 to 28 are
applicable.
83 See WIPO Draft Law of Copyright, supra note 81.
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extend the ban to devices and services that circumvent access control
TPMs.84
2. Scope of Ban
The WIPO provision's TPM ban is broader than the scope of
national copyright law. The provision does not contain a nexus
between legal protection for TPMs and copyright infringement. It
would therefore appear to ban all circumvention devices and services,
irrespective of whether they could be used for lawful non-copyright
infringing purposes. In addition, the Article makes it clear that
manufacture or importation of a circumvention device or service,
regardless of its purpose or actual use, should be treated as a violation
of copyright law and subject to civil and criminal sanctions.85 As a
result, this provision would ban from the marketplace a broad range
of devices and services that would be necessary for consumers and
beneficiaries of exemptions to circumvent TPMs in order to exercise
existing national copyright law exceptions and limitations for
technologically-protected works.
Apart from the absence of a nexus to copyright infringement, it is
also worth noting that the scope of this device and service ban is far
broader than the corresponding ban in the U.S. DMCA. The WIPO
provision bans anything that is "specifically designed or adapted to
circumvent any device or means. '86 This would capture devices and
technologies that have dual or multiple purposes beyond
circumvention but have been adapted after market for circumvention
use, and vendors who market tools that may be adapted for
circumvention even if the vendor might not have knowledge of their
use in circumvention.
3. Exceptions and Limitations
The WIPO TPM provision does not contain any specific
exceptions to the device and service ban. In addition, because the
WIPO TPM provision does not require a nexus to copyright under
national law, there is no mechanism to accommodate existing national
exceptions and limitations. As a result, this provision would preclude
the exercise of all existing exceptions and limitations in respect of
technologically-protected works. Thus, this provision creates the
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approaches reviewed, and correspondingly creates the greatest risk of
restricting access to knowledge for legitimate and non-copyright
infringing purposes.
C. Australia
Australia adopted specific TPM anti-circumvention legislation in
the 2000 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act (the DAA).
The DAA created an innovative TPM legal regime that has since been
replaced by a regime modeled on the DMCA framework as a result of
implementation of the 2004 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
1. Type of Ban
The DAA sought to regulate commercial vendors of circumvention
devices and services. Unlike the approach taken in the DMCA and the
EU Copyright Directive, the original Australian law did not contain a
ban on the act of circumventing a TPM, which would have applied to
individual end-users of copyrighted works.
The DAA prohibited the commercial manufacture and supply of
circumvention devices and services. Section 116A(1) made it an
offence to make, sell, let for hire, promote, advertise, market, or
distribute, or import a circumvention device, with knowledge that the
device or service would be used to circumvent, or facilitate the
circumvention of, a technological protection measure.87
The device and services regulation was more tailored than the
approach taken in the DMCA and EUCD in three respects.
First, the DAA applied to a narrower range of devices. The
prohibition applied to sole purpose circumvention devices and
devices with limited other commercial significance or purpose other
than circumvention.88 Second, instead of an absolute ban on
circumvention technologies, the DAA set up an administrative
process, described below, that provided access to circumvention
devices to "qualified persons" for certain non-copyright infringing
14 ,89permitted purposes.
87 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act of 2000 § I16A(1) (Cth) (amending
Copyright Act of 1968 (Cth)), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol-act/
caaa2000294/.
88 Id. § 10(1): "circumvention device means a device (including a computer program)
having only a limited commercially significant purpose or use, or no such purpose or use, other




CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. Scope of Ban
Third, the scope of the DAA ban was narrower because legal
protection against circumvention was only given to TPMs that had a
nexus with national copyright law Unlike the DMCA, the DAA
provided protection against circumvention of copy control TPMs
which restricted uses of copyrighted works, but not for "pure" access
control TPMs. This was reflected in the DAA's definition of
"technological protection measure" as:
a device or product, or a component incorporated into a
process, that is designed, in the ordinary course of its
operation, to prevent or inhibit the infringement of copyright
in a work or other subject matter by either or both of the
following means:
(a) by ensuring that access to the work or other
subject matter is available solely by use of an access
code or process (including decryption, unscrambling
or other transformation of the work or other subject
matter) with the authority of the owner or licensee of
the copyright;
(b) through a copy control mechanism.90
And subsequently affirmed by the Australian High Court in the Sony
v. Stevens case, concerning a MOD chip that bypassed the region
coding technological measure on Sony Playstations that controlled
access to videogames but did not prevent copying. 91
3. Exceptions and Limitations
By comparison with the legal regime in the DMCA and the
EUCD, the DAA created a more flexible circumvention device
regulation that attempted to regulate commercially-incentivized
circumvention activity, while accommodating certain existing
statutory copyright exceptions that support socially-beneficial
activities through limited access to the means of circumvention
required to exercise those exceptions.
90Id.
91 Stevens v Kabushiki Kaisha Sony Computer Entm't. [2005] HCA 58, (Austi.).
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The DAA effectively created an administrative process that
allowed certain persons or entities to obtain access to circumvention
tools and services in two situations:
(a) Use for Permitted Purposes: Supply of circumvention
devices or services for use by "Qualified Persons" who
provided the supplier with a declaration stating that they
wished to circumvent to make one of various "Permitted
Purposes" and that the protected work was not readily
available to the person in a form that is not protected by a
92technological protection measure.
(b) Making and importation of circumvention devices "for use
only for a permitted purpose relating to a work or other
subject-matter that is not readily available in a form that is
not protected by a technological protection measure"; or "for
the purpose of enabling a person to supply the device, or to
supply a circumvention service, for use only for a permitted
",93purpose.
From the perspective of copyright users, the DAA framework had
one major deficiency-it did not protect non-commercial personal
copying. Even though the DAA did not ban the act of circumventing a
TPM for legitimate purposes, it removed from the marketplace the
circumvention tools that would be needed by end users to exercise
copyright exceptions for protected works. The "Permitted Purposes"
mechanism provided a means of accommodating only a sub-set of the
exceptions and limitations to Australian copyright law. Most
importantly, the "Permitted Purposes" exception did not extend to use
of tools or services for non-copyright infringing "fair dealing" of a
work under sections 40-42 of the Copyright Act. A 2004 review of
the copyright regime recommended extending the Permitted Purposes
exception to ensure that circumvention tools and services would be
92 Copyright Amendment (Digital Agenda) Act of 2000 § 116A(3). "Permitted purposes"
included:
- Reproduction of computer programs for purposes of interoperability, to correct
errors and for security testing;
- Lawful copying by libraries, archives, educational and other institutions,
including institutions assisting persons with an intellectual disability; and
- A lawful use of copyrighted material for the services of the Commonwealth or a
State.
93 Id. § 1 16A(4).
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available to facilitate circumvention for all copyright law exceptions,
including non-infringing fair dealing.94 This would have appropriately
narrowed the scope of legal protection for TPMs to the scope of
Australian copyright law. However, the 2004 TPM recommendations
were not implemented due to restructuring of the Australian TPM
regime as a result of the 2004 US-Australia free trade agreement.
D. US-Australia Free Trade Agreement
Article 17.4(7) of the Free Trade Agreement concluded between
the U.S.A. and Australia in 2004 required Australia to rewrite its
legislation to adopt a legal protection regime for TPMs mirroring the
structure of the U.S. DMCA legislation.9 5
The central issue in the public debate about how to implement the
FTA's TPM obligations was the scope of legal protection to be given
to TPMs. Did the new law have to protect "pure" access control
TPMs that restrict access to works irrespective of whether they
prevent copyright infringement, or instead, should legal sanctions
apply to circumventing a TPM only where it would lead to copyright
infringement? As the U.S. experience with the DMCA had made clear
by the time that this public debate took place in Australia, imposing
legal sanctions for circumventing pure access control TPMs without
any nexus to copyright infringement, would effectively override
existing exceptions and limitations and could harm innovation and
competition policy by allowing rightsholders to use TPMs to control
development of interoperable technologies.9 6
The 2006 Australian legislation reflects these concerns. In terms of
structure, it introduces legal protection for access control TPMs as
well as copy control TPMs. It incorporates a ban on the act of
circumvention of an access control TPM, and on the manufacture,
sale and supply of tools and services that circumvent TPMs (defined
to include both access and copy control TPMs).
94 Phillips Fox, Digital Agenda Review Report, (Jan. 2004), http://www.ag.gov.au/
www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Publications_- PhillipsFoxreportDigitalAgendareview-January2004. See
Recommendation 17, paragraph 2: "That the permitted purposes in section 1 16A (3) be
amended so as to clearly allow any supply or use of a circumvention device or service for any
use or exception allowed under the Act, including fair dealing and access to a legitimately
acquired non-pirated product." Id.
95 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.4(7), May 18, 2004.
96 For this reason the Australian Parliamentary Committee review set up to consider the
structure and nature of exceptions to the new TPM regime recommended that the scope of legal
protection given to TPMs should continue to be limited to the contours of national copyright
law. See Review of Technological Protection Measure Exceptions, issued by House Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs of the House of Representatives, Australian
Parliament on March 1, 2006, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/house/conmmittee/laca/
protection/report/fullreport.pdf.
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The Australian law gives a copyright owner or exclusive licensee a
right to bring an action against a person who knowingly does an act
that circumvents an "access control technological protection measure"
on a work.9 7 "Access control technological protection measure" is
defined to mean a TPM used "in connection with the exercise of the
copyright." 98 The new law also includes new definitions of
"technological protection measure" and "circumvention devices." 99
Taken together, these appear to specifically exclude from the ban on
circumvention tools and services devices and technologies that would
play lawful copies of movies and videogames that are subject to
region coding technological measures used to geographically segment
markets (e.g., a multiregion DVD player that plays a lawfully
purchased DVD from another geographical region), and also devices
that would bypass embedded computer programs in machines or
devices that "restrict the use of goods (other than the work) or
services in relation to the machine or device."' ° This would appear to
cover non-copyrightable items such as universal garage door openers
and printer cartridges, which have been the subject of DMCA
litigation in the U.S.101 The new Australian law removed the flexible
"Permitted Purposes" mechanism and replaces it with the seven
specified exceptions listed in the DMCA and a proceeding for
granting four yearly exemptions to the ban on the act of
circumvention.t2
The new law also contains an important remedy clearly designed
to combat possible misuses of TPMs for non-copyright purposes such
as attempted control of interoperable technologies. It allows a person
who has been threatened with a groundless threat of TPM legal
proceedings to bring legal action for an order declaring that the threat
is unjustifiable, an injunction to restrain the copyright owner or
exclusive licensee from continuing with the groundless threat, or an
award of damages for loss suffered as a result of the threat.
10 3
97 Copyright Amendment Act of 2006 (Cth), Schedule 12, Part 1, § 9 (inserting new §
I 16AN into the Copyright Act of 1968 (Cth)).
98 Id. at Part 1, § 1 (inserting new definition in subsection 10(1)).
99 Id. at Part 1, § 3 & 5 (inserting new definition in subsection 10(1)).
100 See id. at Part 1, sec. 1.
101 See Part Im(C)(2), supra.
102Copyright Amendment Act of 2006 (Cth), Part 1, § 9 (inserting exceptions in §§
116AN(3) and 116AO(3) (interoperability), 116AN(4) and 116AO((4) (encryption research),
II6AN(5) and 116AO(5) (computer security testing), I16AN(6) (privacy), I16AN(7) and
1 16AO(6) (law enforcement and national security), I 16AN(8) (libraries' acquisition decisions),
and 1 16AN(9), 132APC(9) and 249(4) (exemption for prescribed acts of circumvention by
regulations issued by the Governor General)).
I03d. § 202A.
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IV. DAMAGE MINIMIZATION RECOMMENDATIONS
None of the three most widely adopted implementation models
described above provide adequate safeguards to prevent TPM laws
from encroaching on non-copyright public policies such as national
competition regulation, citizens' access to knowledge, freedom of
expression and technology innovation. Fortunately, WCT and WPPT
compliance does not require countries to adopt the DMCA's TPM
regime, nor the European Union or WIPO draft law implementation
models. Based on the review of the deficiencies in the U.S. TPM
regime and the range of policy options available to countries
obligated to implement the WIPO Treaties' TPM obligations,
following is a set of recommendations on how to structure legal
protection for TPMs to minimize harm to important non-copyright
public policies.'04
(1)Require a nexus between legal protection against
circumvention of TPMs and copyright infringement.
Circumventing a technological protection measure or
manufacturing and supplying circumvention devices and
services should only be unlawful if done for the purpose of,
or if it would lead to, infringement of copyright under
national law. In other words, the scope of legal protection for
TPMs should match the contours of national copyright law.
(2)Countries choosing to regulate the manufacture and
supply of circumvention devices and/ or services should
create a flexible mechanism to permit access to, and use of,
circumvention devices and services to use copyrighted works
for non-copyright infringing purposes. This could be done by
establishing a low-barrier process along the lines of the
administrative procedure in former section 116A of the
Australian Copyright Act.
(3)Preserve room for regulating anti-competitive misuse of
TPMs. National TPM legislation should incorporate a "no
mandate" provision to make it clear that technology
developers do not have to design new products, or "refit"
existing products to make them respond to particular
technological protection measures. This provision should
1°4For more detailed recommendations, see EFF Briefing Paper on Technological
Protection Measures for Delegates at the WIPO Intergovernmental Intersessional Meeting on
Proposals to Establish a WIPO Development Agenda (Apr. 2005), available at
http://www.eff.orglP/IPO/dev agenda/EFF_WIPO briefing_041205.pdf.
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apply to devices at the time they were designed. In addition,
TPM laws should expressly provide that rightsholders shall
not use TPMs for anti-competitive purposes. TPM laws
should establish a low-barrier administrative process for
identifying potential anti-competitive misuses, expeditiously
providing a remedy and reduced penalties for "good faith"
circumvention. This could be based on a modified version of
an administrative process under Article 6.4 of the EU
Information Society Directive, such as that in implemented in
U.K. law, or possibly the injunction remedy provided for in
the new Australian law.
(4)TPM circumvention penalties should be structured
carefully to minimize the penumbral chill from
anti-circumvention regulations and to incentivize
socially-beneficial activities such as scientific research,
education, cultural preservation by archives, libraries'
provision of access to knowledge resources, and facilitating
access to disabled communities.
(5) Countries should establish a regular review of the impact
of the TPM legal regime on lawful non-infringing uses, and a
fair process for granting meaningful exemptions to the full
scope of the anti-circumvention ban for legitimate
non-infringing uses. 105
CONCLUSION
At the tenth anniversary of the adoption of the WCT and WPPT, it
is time for a comprehensive evaluation of the costs, benefits and
policy implications of legally-enforced TPMs. Evidence is mounting
that TPMs have not been effective for their intended purpose of
preventing widespread digital copyright infringement. At the same
time, it is now clear that overbroad legal protection for TPMs can
cause harm to a wide range of important public policies outside the
sphere of copyright regulation. National legislators contemplating
implementation of the WIPO Treaties' TPM provisions should
therefore give careful consideration to the scope and structure of the
legal protection provided to rightsholders' TPMs and be wary of
adopting the models found in existing TPM legal regimes.
105 For useful analysis of how to structure a balanced regular review process, see the
AUSTRALIAN PARLIAMENT'S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES' STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
AND CONSTIJTIONAL AFFAIRS REPORT ON TPM EXCEPTIONS, supra note 14, particularly
chapter 3, paragraphs 3.41-3.98; see also EFF Submission, supra note 53.
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